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SUMMARY AND KEY FINDINGS 
 
“Taking back control of fisheries” became one of the totemic issues uniting supporters of the 
campaign to leave the EU. Having left, the issue is again high on the agenda in the ‘future 
relationship’ negotiations. The UK Government has indicated that getting a better deal for 
UK fishermen is a “red line” in the negotiations. This includes increases in quota for UK 
vessels, and restrictions on access to UK waters by foreign vessels. However, the EU has 
linked access to UK waters and maintenance of quotas enshrined in the Common Fisheries 
Policy (CFP) with securing tariff-free trade in fish and other products. 
 
This report focuses on the North Sea and provides an assessment of the risks to stock and 
ecosystem conservation associated with the post-Brexit fisheries negotiations. The report first 
sets out the history behind the allocation of quota shares (Relative Stability) and compares the 
UK shares with those under proposed alternative rules based on the distribution of fish 
(“zonal attachment”). Unless a negotiated agreement can be reached to resolve these different 
views on quota allocation there is a risk that unilateral actions will result in the combined 
catches by all states exceeding the levels required for long-term maximum sustainable yields. 
The report sets out a narrative for the impact of such unilateralism on harvesting rates, and 
then presents results from models which show the risks that these would pose for key fish 
stocks and wildlife. 
 
Key findings of the report 
 
 It is the case that other EU and neighbouring nation states take more fish overall from 
UK waters than UK vessels take from theirs. However, this discrepancy is not 
universal across all fish stocks or regions.  
 
 A combination of Relative Stability and national and international quota swaps and 
trades leave the UK with a preferential proportion of the quota for some species but 
an unfavourable proportion of others. For example, the UK took, on average, 87% of 
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the haddock landings from the North Sea during 2003-2013 which exceeds current 
estimate of the zonal attachment based quota.  
 
 For other stocks such as scallop, crabs and lobster which are valuable to the UK, the 
CFP and Relative Stability plays little or no role as the fisheries are carried out almost 
exclusively within existing national jurisdictions.  
 
 In fact, a high proportion of the apparent disparity between total UK share of catches, 
and reliance of EU vessels on UK waters, is due to just four species – herring, 
mackerel, blue whiting and sandeel.  
 
 In the event of post-Brexit unilateralism on quota setting the likely outcome is 
increased overall fishing levels that would more than double the risk of overfishing 
herring, and increase the risk of North Sea cod stock collapse by 75% (with stock 
levels falling below sustainable limits).  
 
 Reduced food abundance and increased by-catch in fishing gear in a post-Brexit 
unilateralism scenario are likely to be the main risks for wildlife, resulting in a 
projected decline in cetaceans and seabirds. 
 
Key conclusions from the report 
 
Overall, the report demonstrates the importance of international adherence to scientific advice 
on catch limits for shared fish stocks. It is vital that the UK, EU and other coastal states such 
as Norway reach an agreement that that preserves cooperation on fisheries, even in the face of 
political pressure to act independently for short term gain. Otherwise, the outcome will be 
overfishing, eventual collapse of key stocks, declines in seabird and cetacean numbers, 
placing further pressure on the UK’s coastal communities that rely on a healthy marine 
environment to survive. 
 
The potential risk to North Sea cod stocks identified in the report is of particular concern. The 
modelling indicates a 75% risk of cod stocks falling below sustainable limits if the UK and 
other nation states set their quotas unilaterally.  
 
It is also concerning that a unilateralist outcome is expected to lead to declines in seabird and 
cetacean numbers.  The UK Government has identified the conservation of marine wildlife 
for future generations as a key action. These populations are already under pressure from 
climate change and a diversity of human activities so it would be detrimental to add further 
pressure from overfishing.  
 
The findings highlight the need for the UK to have an effective, independent environmental 
watchdog to ensure fishing limits are set at sustainable levels.  
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1. Background 
 
The UK left the European Union on 31 January 2020 under the terms of the “New 
Withdrawal Agreement” [1]. This marked the start of a transition period during which the 
future relationship between the UK and EU will be negotiated, as outlined in the associated 
“Political Declaration”. 
 
The Political Declaration makes specific provisions for the departure of the UK from the 
European Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) which regulates fisheries activities across 
European waters [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. The Declaration states that new arrangements are to be 
sought regarding access to waters and quota shares, while at the same time ensuring fishing at 
sustainable levels to “promote resource conservation, and foster a clean, healthy and 
productive marine environment”. The Declaration envisages that these negotiations will be 
concluded by 1 July 2020 (Political Declaration page 14, Section XII; [1]). 
 
Freedom of access to the UK Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for foreign fishing vessels and 
objections to the CFP ‘Relative Stability’ rules were among the high-profile arguments for 
exiting the EU [2. 9, 10, 11].   Relative Stability is the fixed allocation key which, since 1983, 
has governed how the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for each of the EU-managed fish stocks 
is shared out between the fishing industries of the Member States. The amount allocated to 
each Member State is referred to as ‘quota’ [12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. The UK fishing industry has 
argued that Relative Stability has become grievously unfair to the UK and should be re-
negotiated, advocating that fishing opportunities for shared stocks should be divided 
according to ‘zonal attachment’ – of which there are several definitions but is generally taken 
to refer to the proportional distribution of stock between EEZs [7, 17, 18, 19, 20]. On this 
basis, it is argued that the evidence suggests that the UK should receive a larger quota, or 
proportion of the available TAC, for many of the species and stocks in its own EEZ. 
 
It is clear that access to UK waters for EU vessels and the allocation of quotas will be a key 
strand of the transition-period negotiations regarding future relations [21, 22, 23, 24]. For 
example, the briefing document for the Lords stages of the UK Fisheries Bill 2020 states that: 
 
"The EU is seeking continued reciprocal access to fishing waters and stable quota shares 
for the amount of fish that can be caught. The UK argues British fishing waters should 
primarily be for British fishing vessels, and opportunities for EU vessels should be 
negotiated annually on the basis of scientific data about sustainable catch levels, not 
based on historic quotas." [25]. 
 
There is thus a potential scenario under which there is no agreement on these issues before 
the deadline set by the Political Declaration, or at least not to the satisfaction of the UK 
fishing industry [7, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33].  The plausible worst case consequence 
would be that the UK is unable to effectively police harvesting in its EEZ after the transition 
period [34] and/or ends up unilaterally setting its own quotas within its EEZ in excess of 
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Relative Stability. Given domestic pressure the UK’s aim (officially sanctioned or otherwise) 
would presumably be to take what it regards as its perceived “fair share” of the TAC for 
shared stocks [3, 25], although this carries the risk of retaliatory tariffs on exports of fish 
products to the EU [14, 22, 35, 36, 37]. If the remaining EU Member States adhere to their 
existing Relative Stability quota allocation then, instead of being harvested within the TAC 
limits advised by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), these stocks 
will be over-exploited. 
 
It is to be expected that unilateralism as outlined above would have detrimental consequences 
for fish stock conservation and the principle of harvesting at Maximum Sustainable Yield 
(MSY – the largest yield (or catch) that can be taken from a species’ stock over an indefinite 
period. There would also be consequences for wildlife that depend on there being sufficient 
fish in the sea to feed. However, there has been no risk assessment of these impacts of post-
Brexit fisheries negotiations breaking down into unilateralism. The purpose of this report is to 
provide an assessment of these risks for the North Sea. 
 
2. Overall summary of the report 
 
Relative Stability has been unpopular in the UK fishing industry which perceives that it 
provides the UK with a disproportionately small share of the available resource compared to 
the reliance of the international fishery on the UK EEZ [38, 39]. In any case, as the UK 
leaves the EU, the founding principle of the CFP – that fish stocks are a shared resource in 
shared waters – will no longer apply as the UK will become an independent nation state [6, 
27, 40, 41]. Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
the independent UK will still have a responsibility to cooperate with the EU on the 
management of shared stocks and to minimise the economic impact of any changes on the 
coastal communities of States which have habitually fished in its EEZ or which have made 
substantial efforts in research and monitoring for management purposes [13, 27, 41]. On 
these grounds, the remaining EU Member States might be expected to argue for maintenance 
of the status-quo [26]. However, while the UK Government recognises its international 
commitments [42], the industry is pressing hard for a revision of Relative Stability [38, 39]. 
 
Unfortunately, the basis for negotiating alternative shares of TACs is extremely unclear and 
such negotiations are likely to take a number of years. The negotiating parties (The UK 
Government, The EU and, in the case of the North Sea and west of Scotland regions, the 
Norwegian and Faroese Governments) will be facing conflicting demands from across the 
negotiating table and from interested stakeholders within their own countries. The pressures 
on all of the parties to act unilaterally and claim catches which, when added together will 
exceed the TAC advised by the internationally recognised scientific assessment procedures, 
could become overwhelming. This may be particularly so for the UK since the expectation of 
a substantial boost to catching opportunities as a result of leaving the EU has been raised by 
the rhetoric of the Referendum Campaign [9, 29, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48] and this could lead to 
the UK breaking its obligations under UNCLOS. 
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In order to understand how the UK ended up with the quota shares which became locked into 
the Relative Stability formula, we analysed the history of fishery landings from around the 
UK, and especially in the North Sea, since 1903. Data for this task were obtained from 
official FAO statistics [49], the EU Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for 
Fisheries (STECF; [50]) and the Norwegian Directorate for Fisheries. The spatial 
distributions of landings from across the UK and non-UK EEZs in the North Sea, were then 
compared with estimates of zonal attachment for various fish species. Zonal attachment is an 
expression of the proportion of a shared stock which might be considered to be ‘owned’ by a 
nation based on the distribution of fish relative to its EEZ, and is likely to be a crucial factor 
in future negotiations [17, 19, 20]. However, the purpose here was to develop plausible 
narratives for what the UK might claim as its rightful catch for individual stocks or effort 
limit in the North Sea, in the event of the negotiations breaking down into unilateralism. 
 
For the North Sea, the main element of the unilateralism narratives was a 50% increase in 
pelagic trawl and seine fishing effort, targeting a 70% increase in UK herring quota. The 
narratives also anticipate a smaller (~10%) increase in effort by demersal gears, targeting 
increased UK quota for cod, whiting, saithe and sole. The unilateralism narratives were then 
applied to two completely different types of mathematical models to predict the consequences 
for the food web and fish stocks in the North Sea. The first set of predictions involved the use 
of single species stock projection models - replicating those used by the International Council 
for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) to provide fisheries advice to the EU [51] – to predict 
the probability of seven key stocks (herring, cod, haddock, whiting, saithe, plaice, sole) 
falling below their precautionary reference biomass (Bpa) within 5 years of the onset of 
unilateralism. The second set of predictions involved the use of a food web/ecosystem model 
of the North Sea. This model represented the whole network of interacting flora and fauna in 
the North Sea, from bacteria to whales, and their connections to the physical and chemical 
oceanography of the region, but at coarse taxonomic resolution [52, 53, 54]. This model did 
not resolve individual species, only aggregated groups of related types of species. However, it 
did capture the indirect effects of changes in one group on another as a result of predator-prey 
interactions. 
 
The two modelling approaches produced convergent conclusions on the likely risks 
associated with unilateralism arising from a breakdown of fisheries negotiations. They both 
predict that the greatest risk is to stocks of plankton-eating pelagic fish, especially herring. 
Risks to demersal fish as a whole are much smaller, but within this group there is a 
significant risk to cod stocks. Among the indirect consequences of unilateralism are predicted 
declines in cetaceans and seabirds in the North Sea as a combined consequence of reductions 
in their main food supply (pelagic fish) and increased mortality due to by-catch in fishing 
gears. 
 
3. Details of the research findings 
 
3.1. Patterns of landings in relation to EEZs 
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The infamous fisheries statistic of the UK’s EU Referendum Leave Campaign – that ‘80% of 
UK fish is given away to the rest of Europe’ [10, 11, 55], or that other EU Member States 
take 8-times more fish from UK waters as we take from theirs [2, 56] – is generally supported 
by our analysis of landings data from, the waters around the UK. However, it is shown that 
this high-level generalisation is not applicable at the scale of individual sub-regions or stocks. 
A high proportion of the apparent disparity between UK share, and reliance on UK waters, is 
due to just four species – herring, mackerel, blue whiting and sandeel. In contrast, a 
combination of Relative Stability and national and international quota swaps and trades [7, 
57] leave the UK with a preferential proportion of the TAC for some species. For example, 
the UK took, on average, 87% of the haddock landings from the North Sea during 2003-2013 
which exceeds current estimate of the zonal attachment. For other valuable stocks such as 
scallop, crabs and lobster, the EU plays no role in setting TACs or quotas and the fisheries 
are carried out extensively within existing national jurisdictions.  
  
In the case of the large-scale migratory species such as mackerel and blue whiting, which 
form around a third of the catch by weight from EU waters around the UK (North Sea, west 
of Scotland, Irish Sea, Southwest Approaches and English Channel), there are economic and 
biological reasons why a high proportion of the landings are taken in the UK EEZ. Similarly 
in the case of herring, especially in the North Sea, the stock is mainly harvested during a 
period of the year in which the fish are highly aggregated, and this happens to occur in the 
UK EEZ. In the case of sandeels, around half the annual catch is taken in the UK EEZ, but 
the UK has never had a significant commercial sandeel fishery – the majority of the market is 
as a natural resource for animal and aquaculture feed in Denmark and Norway, and not for 
direct human consumption. Accepting the founding principle of the Common Fisheries Policy 
– of shared stocks in shared waters - the allocation of significant quota shares of these species 
to other EU member states and Norway despite the reliance on UK waters may be 
understandable.  However, as the UK leaves the EU and becomes an independent nation state 
these principles no longer hold [27, 58]. There will be an argument for abandoning Relative 
Stability and negotiating a new deal on the sharing out of the TACs for each of the stocks that 
are shared between the UK, EU and other neighbouring non-EU nations (especially Norway 
and the Faroe Islands). Since this is likely to be strongly resisted by the EU [26] there may be 
pressure in the UK to act unilaterally and claim a quota share in excess of Relative Stability. 
Such action could jeopardise the UK’s international obligation under UNCLOS to collaborate 
with other States on the management of, and access to, shared stocks [13, 27, 41].  
 
For the North Sea, the annual negotiations between the EU and Norway are an additional 
dimension to the sharing out of TACs (see [59] as an example). The EU and Norway operate 
on a principle of reciprocity regarding access to national waters in order to catch their 
assigned share of each TAC. However, the extent of Norwegian landings from the UK EEZ 
has received relatively little attention so far in the discussions on possible post-Brexit 
fisheries. This is partly because non-EU catch data are not included in the EU Scientific, 
Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) databases upon which most 
existing spatial analyses of landings and fishing effort have been carried out [45, 60, 61, 62]. 
Inclusion in this report of spatial data on Norwegian landings from the North Sea obtained 
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from the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries shows that in terms of total landings both 
Norway and the rest of the EU are heavily reliant on the UK EEZ in the North Sea while the 
UK relies very little on access to waters outside its own EEZ (Norway takes 31% of its total 
North Sea landings of fish and shellfish from the UK EEZ, the rest of the EU 55%, and the 
UK 86%). 
 
Within the North Sea, dependence on the UK EEZ varies across the fishery sectors. The UK 
takes more than 95% of its North Sea landings of pelagic (herring, sprat, sandeel) and 
migratory fish (mackerel, blue whiting, horse mackerel) and shellfish from its own EEZ. 
However, somewhat less (71% ) of its North Sea demersal fish landings come from its own 
EEZ. Conversely, the rest of the EU catches over 60% of its total North Sea pelagic and 
migratory species landings from the UK EEZ, but only 30% of demersal fish and 2% of 
shellfish.  Norway takes 47% of its landings of demersal fish from the UK EEZ, and 34% and 
22% respectively of pelagic and migratory species. 
 
Within the UK North Sea EEZ, the UK takes the largest share of demersal fish (49%), while 
the rest of the EU catches the largest share (73%) of pelagic fish (herring, sprat, sandeels). 
Landings of migratory fish (mackerel, blue whiting, horse mackerel) from the UK EEZ are 
roughly evenly divided between the UK, rest of the EU and Norway. For the shellfish species 
(scallop, prawns, shrimps, crabs, lobster), over 98% of the landings from the UK EEZ taken 
by the UK (Fig. 1). 
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Figure 1. Annual average proportions of the total landings of different groups of fish and 
shellfish from the UK EEZ sector of the North Sea (FAO area 27.4) during 2003-2013, 
attributable to the UK, rest of the EU, and Norway. 
 
The main conclusion from this section of the project is that the pattern of reliance on the 
North Sea UK EEZ for fishery harvest is extremely disparate across stocks and nation groups, 
including Norway. The infamous statistic - that 80% of UK fish is given away to the rest of 
Europe – is not a general rule that can be applied in all regions and to all stocks. 
 
3.2. Development of plausible narratives for unilateralist outcomes of fisheries 
negotiations 
 
Against the backdrop of disparate existing distributions of catches, negotiating an equitable 
share of the available TAC for each species and stock is likely to be extremely challenging. 
The basis for an agreement revolves around the concept of zonal attachment, which 
represents the proportion of living resource, or asset, which is rightfully ‘owned’ by each 
nation state which has EEZ within the geographic distribution of the fish. However, there is 
no consensus on the details of how this should be calculated. The White Paper on Defra’s 
vision for a future fisheries policy once the UK is no longer part of the EU [2] contains three 
different and conflicting approaches to estimating zonal attachment, illustrated by examples 
for a few selected stocks. Two of the proposed approaches (proportional distribution of 
historical landings, and proportional distribution of habitat defined by bathymetry (seabed 
depth), latitude and longitude) seem invalid as measures of zonal attachment. Historical 
distributions of where landings have originated from cannot be regarded as equivalent to the 
distribution of fish abundance. Fishers make complex decisions on where to fish based on the 
likely revenue generated by catches relative to quota availability, expenditure on fuel and 
passage times. The second approach based on distribution of habitat is only a crude measure 
of potential, not actual distribution of fish, and in addition seabed depth is insufficient to 
define the habitat of fish. A variety of other factors are associated with fish habitat 
distributions such as prey, seabed sediments, salinity and temperature [63]. The third measure 
in the White Paper – swept area biomass – should provide an indication of the distribution of 
the stock from fishery-independent scientific surveys, but there are several alternative and 
disputed approaches to deriving a figure from these data [17, 20]. Other EU Member States 
are also investigating measures of zonal attachment [8]. 
 
Based on the detailed analysis of all the available landings and zonal attachment data, two 
plausible narratives were developed for UK unilateralism following a hypothetical 
breakdown of post-Brexit negotiations on fisheries in the North Sea.  The first narrative is 
based on TACs for individual stocks in the North Sea, specifically herring, cod, haddock, 
whiting, saithe, plaice and sole. Plausible changes in the fishing mortality of each of these 
species are defined based on the UK claiming an increased share of the TAC for those species 
where the current share of total landings is less than the estimates of zonal attachment (Fig. 
2).  Note that the baseline for these changes is not Relative Stability, but the currently (pre-
Brexit) realised share after taking into account existing quota swaps and trades. The rest of 
10 
 
the EU and Norway are assumed to adhere to their existing share of the total landings, so the 
resulting total exceeds the recommended TAC (Fig. 3). In this narrative, the concern is with 
the overall effect, not with where the catches are taken, though the underlying assumption is 
that non-EU vessels are excluded from the UK EEZ. Based on these criteria, our 
unilateralism scenarios for individual species involve increased claims of quota by the UK for 
herring (+72%), saithe, (+37%), sole (+26%), cod (+16%) and whiting (+14%). The scenario 
envisages no change in UK quota for haddock or plaice in the North Sea since the data on 
recent share of landings are equivalent to, or exceed the estimates of zonal attachment. 
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage changes in quota for key fish species in the North Sea which might 
be plausibly sought by the UK in post-Brexit fisheries negotiations. Values are based on 
estimates of zonal attachment and pre-Brexit Relative Stability shares adjusted by quota 
trades and swaps. In the case of haddock, zonal attachment leaves the UK with an 8% deficit 
of quota share after taking account of quota trades and swaps, so we assume that the UK 
defends status-quo on haddock. In the case of plaice, there are no zonal attachment data 
available, but the proportion of total landings taken in the UK EEZ is close to the UKs 
Relative Stability share so we assume that the UK defends status quo for plaice too. 
 
 
The second narrative is not concerned with quotas and catches of individual species, but with 
the distribution of fishing effort by different gears. The basis for this narrative is that the UK 
denies access to its EEZ for all Norwegian and EU vessels. Norway and the EU reciprocate 
by denying access to UK vessels. The UK then increases fishing effort within its own EEZ to 
absorb the difference between UK effort repatriated from EU and Norwegian waters, and the 
effort vacated in UK waters due to exclusion of EU and Norwegian vessels (except for the 
vacated scope for sandeel trawling in which the UK has no historic interest). EU and 
Norwegian vessels then attempt to catch their existing quota in non-UK waters. Based on 
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these criteria, our unilateralism scenario involves overall increases in pelagic effort (pelagic 
trawling and seine netting (+58%), mackerel long-lining (+20%), and sandeel/sprat trawling 
(+6%), rather smaller (5-10%) increases in effort targeting demersal fish (demersal beam and 
otter trawls and gillnets and lines), and very small (<1%) changes in effort targeting shellfish 
(Fig. 3). 
The effort re-distribution scenario was combined with two realisations of the Landing 
Obligation, to which the UK officially remains committed [2]. The first realisation was based 
on perfect implementation, and second on a probably more realistic partial implementation 
where undersize fish continue to be discarded but there is no over-quota discarding of 
marketable sized fish. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage changes in overall quota for key fish species, and overall effort by 
fishing gears in the North Sea as a result of a unilateralist outcome from post-Brexit 
fisheries negotiations. Left panel shows the change in the combined quotas of all fishing 
nations in the North Sea as a result of unilateralism. The increases are a result of the UK 
claiming quota increases (Figure 2) and the remaining nations adhering to their Relative 
Stability shares of the TAC.  Right panel shows changes in overall fishing effort in the North 
Sea by different gear groups as a result the UK denying access to the UK EEZ for EU and 
Norwegian vessels, with reciprocal action against UK vessels. The figures include an element 
for increased effort required by EU and Norwegian vessels to take their Relative Stability 
quotas in their own waters where catch per unit effort is lower than in the UK EEZ.  
 
 
3.3. Results from modelling the consequences of unilateralism narratives 
 
The single species stock projections suggested that of the seven species examined (herring, 
cod, haddock, whiting, saithe, plaice and sole), the post-Brexit unilateralism scenario would 
affect herring and cod significantly (Fig. 4). These two stocks have a comparatively high 
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probability of being below their precautionary biomass reference points (Bpa) which trigger 
management action even at current rates of fishing. Elevated rates of fishing mortality 
projected under the post-Brexit scenario more than double the risk of falling below Bpa for 
herring, and increase it by 75% for cod. Both stocks have a history of depletion and are 
known to be vulnerable to collapse [64, 65]. The risks are even higher in the short term, 
especially for cod where the current spawning stock biomass (SSB) is already below Bpa 
according to ICES advice [51]. 
 
Figure 4. Percentage probabilities of the spawning stock biomass (SSB) of key species in 
the North Sea falling below their respective precautionary levels (Bpa). Upper panel, short 
term probabilities (5 years), lower panel, long term probabilities (more than 20 years). Blue 
bars indicate the probabilities assuming that status quo fishing conditions in 2017 continue 
unchanged into to the future. Red bars indicate the probabilities under the post-Brexit 
unilateralism scenario. 
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The food web modelling suggested that if Brexit negotiations can be successfully concluded 
then fully implementing the Landing Obligation would lead to small increases in demersal 
fish in the North Sea over the coming 20 years (Fig. 5). The Landing Obligation implies 
improved selectivity of demersal fishing methods so that only marketable sizes of fish are 
captured. As a result, the current landings of demersal fish can be achieved with lower fishing 
mortality rates and higher stock biomass, which should be beneficial to the fishing industry. 
However, increased demersal fish biomass also implies increased predation mortality on 
pelagic fish as an indirect effect of the Landing Obligation, so their abundances decline 
slightly. This response has been exacerbated by the success of fisheries management in the 
past 20-30 years at reducing overall fishing mortality on demersal fish [66, 67, 68]. This 
means that predation mortality now represents a higher proportion of the overall mortality of 
pelagic fish compared to the past, and stocks become less resilient to changes in fishing 
mortality.  
 
Critically, the food web model also indicates that post-Brexit unilateralism would negate any 
benefits of full implementation of the Landing Obligation, and lead to a substantial decline in 
the abundance of planktivorous fish. The effects of unilateralism on demersal fish in the food 
web model are predicted to be much smaller, consistent with the single-species model results.  
 
Indirect consequences for non-target groups of species as a result of the changes in fishing 
under post-Brexit unilateralism, are significantly reduced biomasses of cetaceans and 
seabirds, and increased biomasses of pelagic invertebrates (krill, squid and other macro-
plankton), and of carnivorous and scavenge feeding benthos (mainly crustaceans such as 
shrimps, prawns and crabs). Declines in both cetaceans and seabirds in the model arise from 
the combination of decreasing food supply (planktivorous fish) and increased mortality due to 
by-catch in fishing gears [69]. Seals are predicted to be less vulnerable to the projected 
decline in planktivorous fish due to their greater feeding preference for demersal fish. 
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Figure 5. Simulated progression (years 2, 5, 10 and 20) of changes in the structure of the 
North Sea foodweb following the full implementation of the Landing Obligation (‘improved 
selectivity’) (beginning of year 1) with status-quo fishing effort (successful outcome of 
negotiations) relative to a baseline state in 2003-2013. Each bar represent the percentage 
change in annual average mass (for nutrients and detritus) and biomass for living 
components of the ecosystem relative to the baseline. Green bars indicate an increase, red 
bars a decrease relative to the baseline. Upper panel shows changes to nutrients, flora and 
fauna in the water column. Lower panel shows changes to nutrients and fauna in and on the 
seabed (‘porewater’ values refer to nutrient concentrations within the seabed sediments). 
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Figure 6. As Figure 5, but showing the simulated progression (years 2, 5, 10 and 20) of 
changes in the structure of the North Sea foodweb following the onset of unilateral actions 
due to a breakdown of Brexit negotiations(beginning of year 1). The results assume full 
implementation of the Landing Obligation (‘improved selectivity’) by all nations regardless 
of Brexit.  
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Most of the discrepancy between fishery quota assigned to the UK under Relative Stability 
rules, and either zonal attachments or the proportions of international landings taken in the 
UK EEZ, arise from four key species – North Sea herring and sandeels, and the migratory 
northeast Atlantic mackerel and blue whiting. For many other finfish species the UK’s share 
under Relative Stability (with some adjustments through quota swaps and trades) is more in 
line with zonal attachment. The majority of shellfish species are not covered by Relative 
Stability since their management comes under national jurisdictions. Expectations of large 
across-the-board post-Brexit increases in fishery quotas, raised by the rhetoric of the 
Referendum, are thus misplaced. This is especially so in the North Sea where the bulk of the 
scope for negotiating quota increases is in the pelagic sector.  
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Based on a careful analysis of international landings and effort distributions (including 
Norwegian data) and zonal attachment estimates for fish and shellfish species, we identified 
plausible narratives for UK aspirations in post-Brexit negotiations on North Sea fishery 
quotas. Then, we envisaged what might happen in the event of being unable to achieve these 
goals through negotiation, with the UK under domestic pressure to act unilaterally. We 
developed narratives for changes in quotas and effort that could plausibly arise as a result of 
the UK excluding foreign vessels from its EEZ and setting quotas that, when combined with 
the existing Relative Stability shares of the EU and Norway, exceed the TACs for the species 
concerned, thus threatening conservation and Maximum Sustainable Yield objectives. 
 
Simulations of the consequences for individual North Sea fish stocks and for the ecosystem 
as whole arising from the envisaged breakdown of post-Brexit North Sea fisheries 
negotiations and adoption of unilateralist positions on quotas, were carried out using two 
completely different mathematical models. Both of the modelling approaches were in 
agreement that the greatest threat would be to stocks of pelagic (planktivorous) fish, 
especially herring. Risks to demersal stocks as a whole would be smaller, though the 
sustainability of cod stocks would be significantly threatened. In terms of indirect 
consequences for wildlife, the main risks would be to cetaceans and seabirds which are 
projected to decline due to the combination of reduced food abundance (mainly planktivorous 
fish) and increased by-catch in fishing gear. 
 
Our findings are contingent on the assumption that the UK does not attempt to establish a 
sandeel fishery in its EEZ following exclusion of foreign vessels from its waters. Currently, 
Norway and Denmark catch over 150,000 tonnes of sandeels per year (2003-2013 average) in 
the UK North Sea EEZ while the UK catches only 2000 tonnes. It seems unrealistic to 
suppose that the UK could develop the means to catch and process this resource in the short 
term, even if markets were available and it was supported by policy. Large areas of the UK 
EEZ are explicitly closed to sandeel fishing to protect wildlife, in particular breeding seabirds 
[70], and this will most likely remain a policy commitment. However, if we were to factor the 
establishment of a post-Brexit UK sandeel fishery into our models, in addition to the existing 
quota caught by Norway and Denmark continuing to be taken but outside UK waters, then the 
consequences for the ecosystem would clearly be significantly exacerbated and we could at 
least expect more severe impacts on pelagic (planktivorous) fish and indirect effects on 
cetaceans and birds. 
 
In conclusion, the research findings emphasis the need for a negotiated agreement between 
the UK, EU and Norway on the post-Brexit distribution of fishery quotas. Unilateral quota-
setting for shared stocks jeopardises adherence to the TAC advice provided by ICES. In the 
North Sea, unilateralist actions would threaten the sustainability of key stocks of fish, 
especially herring and cod, and wildlife. 
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